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Abstract 
This article investigates the conditions under which deterministic cycles can emerge in a discrete-time model with 
infinitely lived agents and when the economy is characterized by two sectors producing two perfectly substitutable goods: a 
virgin good and a recycled one. The occurrence of deterministic fluctuations rests upon the countercyclical behavior of the 
recycling industry: an increase in present consumption implies a lower future waste activity together with a lower agents' 
total income, yielding a decline in next period consumption. 
Keywords: Endogenous fluctuations, Recycling activity 
JEL classification: E32, Q53 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we consider an infinite horizon economy with a representative agent consuming a 
homogeneous good and supplying labor elastically. There are two productive sectors. The first one 
produces a virgin good, according to standard constant returns to scale technology. In addition, a 
share of previous period consumption is recycled by means of a concave production function 
including a linear shrinkage cost (Martin, 1982). Profits of the recycling activities are distributed to 
the agents by means of lump-sum transfers. The hypothesis on the source of waste is similar to that 
postulated by De Beir et al. (2010): the recycling activity involves past-period virgin good production. 
In such a framework, agents accumulate capital and the dynamics describing intertemporal 
                                                Corresponding author. 
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equilibrium is three-dimensional. Stability conditions involve therefore an accurate parameter 
calibration. Conversely, under our assumption about the origin of waste and by getting rid of capital 
accumulation, the dynamics boils down to a simple first-order difference equation in terms of past-
period and present consumption. We show that under mild assumptions on the recycling cost and 
provided the waste technology is concave enough, there arise deterministic cycles through a flip 
bifurcation. This result mimics standard multi-sector models, but the mechanism does not rely upon 
dramatic reversals in capital intensity across sectors (see, among the others, Boldrin and Rustichini, 
1994). Rather, cycles are due to the countercyclical behavior of the recycling-sector profits: when 
present consumption increases, tomorrow waste activity will be pushed down and agents' total 
income, together with consumption, will be lower. 
 
Waste recycling activities concern growing industries for a large number of raw materials and these 
activities involve many kind of waste. For instance, European countries achieve record numbers in 
the recycling rate of glass (80%), of paper-cardboard (60%) and aluminium (75%). Nowadays, the 
world production of recycled aluminium is greater than the production of virgin aluminium. 
Economic literature analyses recycling from three theoretical points of view. First, recycling is 
integrated into the analysis of industrial organization; following the Alcoa case, studies have analyzed 
the erosion of monopoly power by competitive firms of recycled products (Grant, 1999). Second, 
natural resource economics studies point out the usefulness of recycling for economies facing a 
decrease in the availability of resources; recycling postpones the extraction of mining resources and 
reduces the intensity of forest exploitation (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). Third, environmental 
economics analyses recycling as an instrument to reduce environmental externalities (Lusky, 1976). 
Yet, these studies do not analyze the consequences in terms of economic stability of the life cycle of 
the goods allowed by the recovery waste activity. This lacking literature justifies therefore our paper, 
which focuses on the consequence in terms of economic stability and of the occurrence of 
deterministic cycles of the recycling activity. 
 
Our contribution improves the existing literature on endogenous fluctuations and it seems to 
confirm that in order to get such a phenomenon one does not need strong external effects in 
production, as it the case in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), where a upward sloping labor demand 
curve is required, or sector specific external effects as in Benhabib and Farmer (1996) where sunspot 
equilibria are compatible even with a downward sloping labor demand curve. At the same time, the 
occurrence of cycles, in our paper, is perfectly consistent with the assumption of long-lived agents 
and does not require the restricted market participation typical of the overlapping generations models 
(e.g. Azariadis, 1981, Azariadis and Guesnerie, 1984; Grandmont, 1985) where cycles of different 
periodicity emerge when there are some – although mild – income effects in the consumption-labor 
arbitrage. In our study periodical cycles are compatible with the individual smoothing behavior and 
with whatever curvature of the utility functions, provided the economy is located in the region where 
profits are decreasing. The issue treated in this paper therefore confirms the idea that endogenous 
fluctuations are a quite pervasive phenomenon since they emerge even in very simple standard 
framework, once one departs from the basic and very restrictive typical assumptions. In this sense, 
endogenous cycles can be seen not just as a mere theoretical curiosity, but a phenomenon which is 
bound to occur even under very slight distortions which imply the failure of the First Welfare 
Theorem. In our case, all what is required to get cycles is a recycling activity entailing an external 
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effect on future consumption: today consumption affects, in fact, tomorrow one by means of a direct 
– although not taken into account by agents – modification of the production possibility frontier.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we develop the theoretical model 
and derive the difference equation describing intertemporal equilibrium and the stationary solution as 
well. Section 3 discusses the stability properties of the model and derives conditions that guarantee 
the emergence of economic fluctuations. Finally, Section 4 contains the main conclusions of the 
paper and suggests some reliable extension to be carried out in the future.  
2. The model 
There exists a continuum of infinitely-lived identical agents whose size is normalized to unity. The 
objective of the representative agent is to maximize his intertemporal welfare:  
     tt
0t
t lvcuβmax   
 
subject to the dynamic budget constraint: 
 
ttttt plc  tp  
 
where c stands for consumption, l for labor and  0,1β  for the discount factor. u is the 
instantaneous utility function of consumption, v the disutility of labor, p the price of both the virgin 
and the recycled good, ω the nominal wage and π the real profit obtained in the recycling sector, 
which is assumed to be given from the point of view of the single agent. The functions u and v satisfy 
standard assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1. u and v are continuously differentiable as much as needed. In addition,   0' cu ,   0'' cu ,   0lim '0  cuc ,   0lim '  cuc ,   0' lv ,   0'' lv ,   0lim 0  lvl ,    lvllim . 
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π(c) 
g( c) 
ηc 
 
Figure 1: Profit of the recycling sector 
 
The First Order Conditions of the maximization problem yield the arbitrage condition: 
    t
t
t
t cup
lv ''                                                                         (1) 
 
Condition (1) claims that the effort of supplying one additional unit of labor must be equal to the 
correspondent increase in utility. The virgin good yv is produced by means of a linear technology 
which employs only labor i.e. yv=l where v stands for virgin. The profit in nominal terms is then 
tt
v
t ly tp . It follows that at equilibrium one has wt=pt and therefore profits in this sector are zero 
for each t=1,2… . Recycled goods and virgin goods are perfect substitutes. A recycling sector 
competes directly with the virgin production sector. The representative firm includes recovery and 
recycling activities. Following Swan (1980) and Martin (1982), we suppose that the production factor 
is the recovered waste and that the returns are decreasing (a characteristic of the technology of 
recovery). Hence, the recycled good is produced according to a concave production function g which 
recovers a share  0,1  of the previous period consumption at the fixed cost1 0η  . As the two 
goods are in fine perfect substitutes, we assume that it is possible to recycle goods an infinity of time.  
 
Assume a mandatory recycling sector implying that there is no profit maximization task: it is indeed a 
public sector. Moreover, it exists in many European countries, private companies accredited by the 
public authorities (for example DSD in Germany) which have to sort all the available households 
waste packaging. Therefore the real net output (i.e. real profit) of the recycling sector will be (see Fig. 
1): 
     11   tt ccg  t                                 (2) 
 
                                               
1 η is the shrinkage cost and it represents the costs linked to the recycling activity: a share is lost during the waste recovery 
stage or during the recycling process. 
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The production function g possesses the following properties. 
 
Assumption 2.       0g ,0g ,0 '''  xx0g  
 
 
 
c  c* 
v’(c – π(c)) 
u’(c) 
c 
 
Figure 2: Arbitrage condition and equilibrium 
Since ttt lπc   and at equilibrium p = ω, the arbitrage equation (1) boils down to: 
       ttt ccc '' uv  1                                                        (3) 
 
In view of Assumptions 1 and 2, it is easy to prove the existence of a unique stationary solution. In 
fact, as depicted in Fig. 2 the right hand side of (3) is non-increasing and continuous, while its left 
hand side is decreasing first and thereafter negative. Then, for all c>cmin, where: 
   cπcminvargc 'cmin   
 
 
it slopes positive and for cc   it is  cc . Therefore, for all cc  ,   cπcv '   is positive, 
increasing and diverges to infinite when c . It follows that it will cross  cu '  exactly once, for 
some cc *  . This, in particular, implies that at the steady state   1cπ '  . 
 
Proposition 1. Equation (3) possesses a unique interior steady state 0 cc *  with   0**  cc *l . 
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3. Stability properties 
In order to study the stability of equation (3), we evaluate the derivative / 1dc dct t c c
       at the 
steady state. For sake of simplicity in notation we omit the asterisk over the steady state value of a 
variable. Straightforward computations yield the following expression for / 1dc dct t c c
             culv cπlv '''' '''                                                             (4) 
 
The sign of (4) is the same of that of  c  , since   0v l   and   0cu ''  . Suppose first that   0cπ ''  , i.e. that the steady state lies in the increasing locus of the profits function of the recycling 
sector. As it is shown in the following Proposition, in such a configuration the steady state is 
monotonically stable. 
 
 Proposition 2. Assume   0cπ ''  . Then 0 / 11dc dct t c c       and the steady state is monotonically stable. 
 Proof. 1
v l c
v l u c
                      
     requires      1v l c u c       . But, by definition of c ,  and from the 
concavity of π, we have   1c   . Therefore, again in view of the concavity of π, one has     1cπcπ '*'  . It follows that expression (4) is lower than one. 
 
 
It is now immediate to verify that / 01dc dct t c c
       when   0cπ '  . We wonder if the steady 
state may undergo a flip bifurcation, i.e. whether there exists some parameter configuration such that 
/ 1dc dct t c c
      = -1, To this end, let us write equality 1v l cv l u c                           in the form   1.u cc
v l
             Since, at the steady state equilibrium, we have    cu 'lv '  we can write   1
c
l
ε
ε
cπ
v
u'   where    cc/ucuε '''u   is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption 
and    ll/vlvε '''v   is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of working. Since     ηcgcπ ''    
one obtains condition   1g cc u lg c c cvg c                   . Setting now    /g c c g cg     the 
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elasticity of the recycling production function, we can write 1
g c
u lg c cv
            . Eventually, 
taking into account that   ηcπφcg  , we get 1.u lg c cv           It follows that the 
bifurcation value of εt is: 
 
c
πη
1
c
π
1ε
ε
-η
ε v
u
F
g 
                                                               (5) 
 
We must now verify that  0,1ε Fg  . Since cπ '   it is immediate to see that 0Fgε  if and only if 
1 1 0u cv
          . Furthermore, 1Fgε  requires cπ1cπ1εε- vu   , condition always verified in 
the light of the previous considerations. One can immediately appraise that, as soon as η increases 
from   cπ1εε1 vu  to infinite, the bifurcation value for εg increases from zero to one. We have 
therefore the following Proposition, which is immediately proved once one takes into account that, 
as shown in Grandmont (2008) and Bosi and Ragot (2011), in nonlinear systems the occurrence of a 
flip bifurcation entails the existence of 2-period deterministic cycles near the steady state for a whole 
range of values close to the bifurcation one. 
 
 Proposition 3. Assume   0c    and 1 1 0u cv          . Then: 
(i) For 0 1Fg g     the steady state is unstable and the economy diverges following oscillatory paths. 
(ii) For 0 1Fg g     the steady state is stable and the economy converges following oscillatory paths. 
In addition, when g  goes through Fg , the steady state undergoes a flip bifurcation. 
If, conversely, 0 1 1u cv
          , then the steady state is stable and the economy converges following oscillatory 
paths. 
 
In order to understand the mechanism on the ground of which cycles may arise, let us suppose that 
at the steady state profits are decreasing. Let us suppose, in addition, that in period t consumption is 
larger than its steady state value. It follows that the profits of the waste activity will be lower, in view 
of the concavity of the function and taking into account that profits are distributed only one period 
later: it follows that consumption in period t+1 will decrease. But following an analogous reasoning, 
profits in period t+2 will be larger and so will be consumption, yielding perpetual oscillations around 
the steady state. These results open the door for stabilization environmental policies. One of the 
central parameters, among others, is the η term. Hence, government may use market-based 
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instruments (tax and subsidies) to influence this cost or command and control instruments (like   ) ,  
such as economic fluctuations are avoided. Actually, European governments mix these two 
instruments to achieve environmental objectives. For example, in the case of the packaging waste 
policy, since 1994, a state-registered eco-organisation subsidizes the recovery sector in each EU 
country; moreover, the 1994 EU Packaging Directive determines minimum recovery and recycling 
targets for packaging waste. 
One may wonder at this point how our results would be different if, instead of assuming that the 
recycled good is produced according to a concave function, it were produced according to other 
types of technologies. The answer is quite complex, but there is one point that must be emphasised. 
Indeed, as we have shown, the occurrence of endogenous cycles is dramatically linked to the 
emergence of a decreasing profit function. Within an alternative technology, this could be no more 
the case and, as a consequence, the phenomenon would completely disappear. For instance, if the 
production function were convex, profit would always be increasing in the amount of the recycled 
good and therefore the countercyclical behavior of the profit function, which is responsible for the 
occurrence of cycles, would no more be at work. The same is true if we assume a linear technology 
which, along with the assumption of a linear shrinkage cost, would entail profits either always 
defined positive (but not countercyclical in the amount of the input) or always negative (and 
therefore there would be no recycling activity at all).  
 
Another interesting question is concerned with the behavior of the economy under the assumption 
that the shrinkage cost has a variable component instead of considering it only with a fixed cost 
component. Here the answer is straightforward: in the case that the shrinkage cost is convex, the 
countercyclical behavior of the profit function would be exalted and therefore endogenous 
fluctuations would be even more likely to occur. In the opposite case where the shrinkage cost is 
concave, the profit would conversely be always increasing in the waste activity and, as a consequence, 
no countercyclical behavior would emerge. As a result, there would be no room for endogenous 
cycles. 
 
In our paper we have assumed that the virgin good and the recycled good are perfect substitutes. 
This means that, from the point of view of the representative household, they share the same market 
price and therefore he is completely indifferent in respect to which of the two goods to consume. If, 
on the contrary, we assume that the two goods are not perfect substitutes, there are two possible 
configurations that may emerge. If, on the one hand, the utility function of the representative agent is 
defined exclusively on one good, the market arbitrages would drive the price of the two goods to the 
same value. Indeed, if it were not the case, agents would buy exclusively the cheaper good, driving 
down the price of the other. This process would be at work until the two prices would become equal. 
If, on the other hand, the utility function of the representative household is defined over two 
different commodities, their relative price could be different from unity. In such a case, agents would 
make opportune arbitrages in terms of consumption streams, by equalizing the marginal rate of 
substitution with the relative price of the two goods, as in a standard model with several 
commodities. 
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4. Conclusion 
The European Countries have adopted the European Directive of 2002 concerning the disposal of 
electrical and electronic waste. Producers of these goods contribute to one of the four State-
registered eco-organisations (Eco-Systemes, ERP, Ecologic, and Recyclum). This Directive imposes 
also a minimum level for the recycling rate, depending on the kind of waste. More generally, the 
European Commission encourages the development of the recovery and the recycling of waste 
because it could be a tool for sustainable development policies. However, these mechanisms can be a 
source of economic fluctuations and therefore may be handled with some care. As a matter of fact, 
in this paper, within a very simple model, we have shown that for some values of the elasticity of the 
recycling technology, the development of the recycling activities may lead the economy towards 
cyclical as well as unstable trajectories. Stabilization polices involve an accurate control of the 
required rate of the industrial goods recycling activity and, perhaps, the introduction of some upper 
bound on the recovering waste activity in order to avoid unpleasant effects in terms of economic 
stability. As we have shown, indeed, cycles appear when economic waste activity lies in the region 
where profits in this sector are declining, i.e. when the recovery rate is high enough. 
 
The paper can be improved and generalised by means of several extensions. As we have seen, one 
could assume the two goods, the virgin one and the recycled one, to be not perfect substitutes. In 
such a case there would emerge, at equilibrium, a relative price not equal to unity. We would indeed 
obtain a genuine two-sector model, although the inputs used in the two sectors would be not the 
same. Another improvement is concerned with the assumption of a separable utility function in 
consumption and labor. Indeed, in the case of a non-separable utility function the requirements 
needed to get endogenous fluctuations would be probably relaxed and the latter would emerge for a 
wider parameter configuration. One could also be interested in analyzed the possibility of 
endogenous fluctuations under the hypothesis of more general production technologies, as we have 
discussed at the end of Section 3. Of course, some empirical exercise could be done to test our 
theoretical results. Finally, it would be interesting to study the effects of the presence of a recycled 
good in an overlapping generation model: in such a configuration, beside agents with a finite life 
cycle there would be a good with its own life cycle and the combination of the two time structures 
could give interesting and new insights.  
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